This paper explores the tensions between analyzing IT-related change requirements to support knowledgeas-thing versus knowledge-as-process. We explore these tensions in the high-risk decision-making environment of an Immigration and Naturalization Service agency. The study combines competitive intelligence risk-analysis methods with an ethnographic analysis of knowledge-flows, to determine how the roles of human decision-makers may be supported effectively by ICT-based knowledge support. Our findings demonstrate how high-risk decision-making may be analyzed as a integrated hybrid human/ICT intelligence system. The study exposes detailed mechanisms by which knowledge of different forms is transferred, exposing failures in training, interpersonal communications, ICT system support, ad reward structures. We identified four roles for ICT support, to supplement human intelligence effectively in this hybrid system. Four stages of analysis are suggested by the hybrid intelligence framework: (i) risk-category identification, (ii) the application of risk-categories to decision-cases, (iii) testing and adapting categorizations against global conditions, and (iv) transfer of locally-meaningful categorizations of risk across communities of practice. The contributions of this paper are to provide a knowledge taxonomy for such analysis and to suggest a framework by which roles for ICT support in complex and distributed, highrisk decision-making environments may be explored.
Introduction
This paper explores a fundamental contradiction between two paradigms of organizational knowledge management. In the organizational management of knowledge literature, knowledge is conceived as situated within a specific workgroup with distinct sociocultural rules, norms, and implicitly-shared understandings. Organizational knowledge is embedded in the shared practices, artifacts, and language of group members (Cook and Brown 1999; Lave and Wenger 1991) . But in the more technically-oriented, knowledge-based systems literature, the use of information and computer technologies (ICTs) to communicate knowledge among distributed workgroups depends on knowledge being captured, stored, and transferred between people located in many different places -i.e. across multiple communities of practice. This requires an epistemological interpretation of knowledge that reduces and reifies knowledge-in-the-head, then externalizes this "reduced" knowledge to become information-as-thing (Buckland 1991) . The application of appropriate information management and codification techniques should permit decision-related "knowledge" to be captured, stored, and transferred across workgroups (Johnson et al. 2002; Leibowitz 2001) . But information management presents too limited a model for the management of diverse and distributed knowledge (Zack 2001) . If knowledge realization, sharing, and use are envisaged as a set of emergent, improvisational work-processes (Markus et al. 2002) , then it would appear that most knowledge management analysts ask the wrong question. Distributed groups of decision-makers require technology that is appropriate to the decision-making tasks in which they engage. Instead of asking "What knowledge can we codify and how, to automate current work-processes?", we should ask, "Which decision-processes is it appropriate to automate for effective knowledge management, how, and why?".
We contrast the perspectives of knowledge-as-process and knowledge-as-thing, arguing that the two perspectives are necessarily complementary for effective knowledge management in organizations. A focus on knowledge-as-process analyzes how we may support human activity with information and communication technologies (ICTs), while a knowledge-as-thing focus analyzes what knowledge is capable of externalization and reuse, ignoring the tacit knowledge and expertise of critical decision-makers. Managers in organizational practice resolve the dichotomy between what can be automated and what it is appropriate to automate pragmatically and heuristically, every day. But the success of such heuristics depends upon individual experience, built out of trial-and-error. This naturally incurs a great deal of failure. To explore this dichotomy, we investigated the issuing of work and residency visas to foreign nationals wishing to visit a western economy prior to September 11, 2001 . The failures of decision-making around that time have been widely publicized and reflect a lack of knowledge-sharing across various internal work-groups. Our findings are of interest not only in illustrating how failures to share relevant knowledge can undermine effectiveness, but also in providing a decision-support framework for ICT-mediated knowledge sharing that can be applied to many other contexts.
Conceptual Background The Creation Of Organizational Knowledge
Knowledge-as-process -knowledge that relies on tacit understandings, skills and expertise for its application -is created through reflection on and internalization of the meanings of the routine activities, conversations, and interactions in which organizational actors habitually engage. These frameworks provide in-the-head models that permit individuals to make sense of a situation and determine how to act without time-consuming analysis (Weick 1995) . The result of habitual practice is automaticity: the tacit application of internal decision-frameworks to guide expert behavior without the need for conscious reflection (Shiffrin and Schneider 1977) .
Automaticity may be the result of internalizing sociocultural values, as newly-arrived group members learn how to perform skillfully by observing the practices of existing group members.
Organizational processes do not result in explicit, objective knowledge, but in the tacit, shared understandings of work that define expertise within a community of professional practice (Lave 1991) . Knowledge-as-process reflects a local view of expertise, embedded in a local knowledge community. A knowledge community is constituted through interactions between group routine practice and individual rationalizations of how to act. Expertise is developed through continual improvisation, to constitute a dynamic knowledge resource for local practice (Weick 1998) .
Organizational practices are interpreted through informal means, involving symbolic and ritual forms of interaction in work, as group members mutually constitute organizational practice (Majchrzak et al. 2000; Suchman 1998 ). An organizational change perspective therefore privileges adaptive technology support for the informal collaboration practices of local groups over a more formal, global focus on knowledge-definition and information structures.
Knowledge-as-thing -knowledge that has been formalized, proceduralized, and reified, to exist independently of its creator -is the product of joint work-processes (Nonaka 1994) .
Organizational actors create standardized procedures, documents, rule-based information systems (IS) and other forms of intersubjectively-shared artifacts, that constitute an "investment in form" (Star 1989) . Such rules, procedures and artifacts exist to define "best practice" but tend to be normative and immutable as they acquire a meaning that is independent of their creator through persistent use (Latour 1987) . These knowledge resources can persist long after they have outlived their usefulness, even in the face of evidence to suggest that they are counterproductive, simply because they acquire ritual status or because they are associated with organizational value-systems (Markus 1984; Weick 1998) . The intersubjective knowledge acquired through shared practice is converted into generically-subjective knowledge (knowledge that is commonly accepted as objective and therefore propagated outside of the workgroup in which it originated) by means of formal knowledge-resources such as decision-making procedures, management policies, or the administrative and IT systems used to control organizational work (Weick 1995) .
This form of knowledge is not subject to development through improvisation and so tends to be relatively static. It is developed through the global acceptance and legitimization of local improvisations, which may be subject to much conflict and disagreement. IT systems requirements analysis may be seen as a constant quest for the generic. IT analysis is a constant search for structures, that are taken to be in-the-world, focusing on the relationships between human agency and informational objects that may be used to represent those structures. The analysis of locally-specific, informal knowledge requires an understanding of the special cases that complicate a generic classification of work. This imposes a detour on the road to devising one-size-fits-all rules that can be applied to situations regardless of circumstances. IT analysts tend to privilege the knowledge-as-thing perspective just because it is so hard to understand knowledge-as-process. We would argue that this is counterproductive in most organizations, as local improvisation and discovery provide the basis for organizational innovation and change.
Because of its emphasis on formal and objective forms of knowledge, the knowledge-asthing perspective has been privileged in traditional views of IT systems analysis. This perspective focuses on the generation of formal rules and procedures that are simple to computerize. In contrast, the knowledge-as-process perspective emphasizes informal, subjective forms of knowledge that are created and applied through personal interactions and are extremely difficult to articulate. Knowledge-as-thing spans local knowledge communities to reflect a global view of expertise that is proceduralized to provide post-rationalizations of why specific forms of action are appropriate. Knowledge-as-process is situated within a local community of practice (tailored to the situation of the local group) and so needs little justification or debate. We explore knowledge exchange within and across knowledge-communities in a distributed organization to reconcile the tensions between knowledge-as-thing and knowledge-as-process, so that we may support both perspectives of knowledge management in IT-related change analysis. Our thesis is that most approaches to the support of knowledge management processes privilege one of these perspectives at the expense of the other, depending on whether knowledge management needs are analyzed in terms of knowledge exchange or knowledge capture and retrieval via IT systems.
So our research question is:
How may the two alternate views of knowledge (knowledge-as-process vs. knowledge-as- 
thing) be reconciled to produce a way of analyzing systems of information technology that support human information processing?

Analyzing Knowledge-Exchange
We adopted the SECI model of knowledge creation and use (Nonaka 1994) , as the framework for our analysis as this model reconciles a local, largely tacit, knowledge-as-process view of knowledge management with a global, externalized and explicit knowledge-as-thing perspective. The SECI model, shown in Figure 1 , explains the processes by which sociallyconstructed knowledge is created, transformed into externalized and combined forms that may be mediated and used across multiple workgroups, then internalized to provide an iterative cycle (or "spiral") of knowledge transfer and adaptation (Nonaka 1994) . Knowledge-as-process is created through internalization: the process of embodying external, explicit, combined knowledge into routines and unreflective procedures, so that it becomes internal to the individual (Nonaka and Konno 1998) . This requires "perspective-taking": the exchange, evaluation, and integration of knowledge sources into routine work-processes (Boland and Tenkasi 1995) . An individual "locates themselves" in the organization by identifying organizational knowledge that is relevant to their own work, reflecting upon the way in which this knowledge can be applied and then applying the knowledge until it becomes habitual (Nonaka 1994) . External (to a local group) practices and standards become internalized by the individual in terms of "professionalism", "best practice", or "how we do things here" (Lave and Wenger 1991) . Once knowledge has been acquired, knowledge transfer from the knowledge-asprocess perspective occurs at a tacit level, developing intersubjective understandings of work practice. This is achieved through socialization: the process of adapting and developing knowledge as a result of shared experiences (Nonaka and Konno 1998) . By participating in shared work practices, the individual acquires automatic skills that are understood in terms of group values and expertise (Lave and Wenger 1991) . The resulting inter-subjective knowledge is shared between group members without their being capable of articulating it (Weick 1995) .
The generically subjective forms of knowledge required by the knowledge-as-thing perspective are created through externalization. Tacit knowledge is converted into explicit knowledge through articulation. This requires "perspective-making": narrativizing the reflexive monitoring and rationalization of one's own or others' discourse and behavior (Boland and Tenkasi 1995) . It may be achieved by means of conversations between individuals to debate how something should be done, or through reflexivity --the type of self-conscious reflection involved in understanding and writing a description of one's own work processes (Nonaka and Konno 1998) . Through externalization, habitual practice is made explicit: articulated and understood in ways that provide a resource on which other organizational actors may call to discover "best practice". The explicit knowledge transfer required for the knowledge-as-thing perspective proceeds through combination: the process of converting local group knowledge that has been recognized and articulated --and can therefore be stated explicitly in terms of rules and procedures --into systematic knowledge-resources that are made accessible to the wider organization (Nonaka and Konno 1998) . Combined knowledge results in the creation of shared knowledge resources that formalize generically subjective (or what most organizational actors would call "objective" as these are generally agreed definitions of best practice). This creates management control systems that reflect organization-wide norms and values (Weick 1995) .
Combination provides a form of knowledge repository that is considered uncontentious, serving as a resource for others to internalize on the next cycle of knowledge creation and transfer (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) .
Breakdowns In Automatic Knowledge-Creation
We have seen how, through the daily practices of work, organizational actors may construct a set of knowledge perspectives that reflect a tacit recipe for success: a "theory-in-use" of how the organization works. This is very different from the "espoused theory" of work that people will articulate when you ask them how they work (Argyris and Schön 1978) . The latter tends to reflect formal organizational rules and procedures people more than what people actually do in practice. Theories-in-use reflect knowledge-as-process, while espoused theories reflect knowledge-as-thing, which may diverge substantially from the theories-in-use applied by knowledgeable practitioners. The problem with following an individual theory-in-use is that it is rarely challenged. Argyris and Schon argue that learning in organizations involves the detection and correction of errors. Most individuals work automatically, adjusting their routine goals, plans, and rules of information processing only when their work outputs can be demonstrated not to meet the accepted criteria for success. To break out of this "single loop learning", individuals need to examine and evolve the assumptional frameworks that constitute their theory-in-use.
They need to understand what contingencies and variables govern how they perform their work and scan the environment in which they work for changes in these variables. This allows them to engage in "double-loop learning", preemptively adapting their work goals, plans, and rules to apply to new contingencies as these arise. This can be very difficult as theories-in-use are tacit and so not accessible to conscious processes of evaluation (Argyris and Schön 1978) . Winograd and Flores (1986, after Heidegger 1962) argue that a theory of cognitive breakdowns may be useful in explaining how theories-in-use evolve. A breakdown represents a cognitive disconnect during which we question (and so become aware of) the nature of taken-forgranted concepts, practices, and artifacts. A breakdown occurs when an individual's automatic (assumed, axiomatic) definition of how an artifact or process behaves is no longer sufficient to explain the behavior of the artifact or process: " A breakdown is not a negative situation to be avoided, but a situation of non-obviousness, in which the recognition that something is missing leads to unconcealing (generating through our declarations) some aspect of the network of tools that we are engaged in using. A breakdown reveals the nexus of relations necessary for us to accomplish our task". (Winograd and Flores 1986, p. 165) .
Under conditions of breakdown, individuals question their taken-for-granted assumptions about how the world works. This type of process leads to a new "loop" of automaticity, as they are forced to reflect upon and redefine (to themselves or to others) the basis that underlies their decision-making and action. For example, if a visa officer approves a request for a visa and that person is proven to pose a security risk, the visa officer may be forced to reexamine their approval criteria. Breakdowns therefore provide a productive mechanism for organizational learning, as they force the individual to clarify and to question their assumptions, and to include new evidence in framing a situation. This leads to revised interpretations of the situation that create new distinctions in the risk-assessments that the visa officer applies to their decisions. But breakdowns are not just concerned with an individual's life-world, but also their social world:
"It is only when a breakdown occurs that we become aware of the fact that 'things' in our world exist not as the result of individual acts of cognition, but through our active participation in a domain of discourse and mutual concern." (Winograd and Flores 1986, p. 78) .
In order to change how knowledge is collected, valued and used, we need to induce a collective breakdown in the way that workgroups interpret their social world: the norms, expectations, language, and practices that underlie the "domain of discourse and mutual concern" and so define professional practice. To "manage" knowledge as the basis for effective organizational action, we need to first understand, then proactively challenge the socio-cultural constructs that underlie shared sensemaking and collective action in organizational practice.
Enabling Breakdowns Through Risk Assessment
The question remains as to how we may integrate the knowledge constructs discussed above. We may achieve a breakdown in automatic action, by confronting individuals with consequences that demonstrate the mismatch between their theory-in-use and their espoused criteria for success. Or we may achieve a breakdown through interactions with others that lead to a discord between their automatic (internalized) set of plans and work-routines and the plans and routines espoused by others in similar circumstances (Winograd and Flores 1986) . In the study reported here, we attempted both of these mechanisms by applying competitive intelligence techniques that incorporate risk assessment. Competitive intelligence provides a useful model for national intelligence (the knowledge domain underlying our study), as it considers risk management explicitly (Noyes 2004; Pattakos 1998) . Most competitive intelligence process management models take the form of a cycle that provide a variation of stages to plan, assess, manage and monitor strategy (Herring 1998; Noyes 2004; Pattakos 1998) . Competitive intelligence management processes are related to knowledge management in their evaluation of information use, but in addition these techniques assess the decision models employed by knowledge workers, by means of a risk assessment (Heinrichs and Lim 2005) . Risk assessment provides a useful way of breaking frame, as it requires that the individual surface (make explicit) and evaluates their assumptional framing of the decision-making process from a risk-management perspective. We therefore selected a competitive intelligence analysis process that focused primarily on risk assessment, relating risks to knowledge management (NCISSE 1998) . This process is shown in Figure 2 . 
Research Method
This study investigated knowledge management practices and the use of specific types of knowledge management (KM) systems, at the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of a country in the western economy. To protect the anonymity of individuals engaged in high-risk activities that involve the security of multiple nations, we refrain from naming specific countries, agencies or our data collection sites. The data collection approach is summarized in Table 1 . Figure 2 24 analysts from INS; 12 analysts from "friendly country" law enforcement agencies Explore decision-processes used to answer the key intelligence questions Telephone and email interviews 2 senior managers from prime IT vendor; 2 senior INS law-enforcement managers; 10 Visa approval analysts at different levels of experience and seniority.
Understand current role of IT in supporting decisionmaking for visa approval processes
We employed a facilitative approach to data collection, that involved subjects in constant validation of our findings at all stages of the research. We utilized a mixed method approach to data analysis, where qualitative analysis of interview and workshop data was combined with competitive intelligence analysis techniques to categorize of (anonymized) sample visa approval decision data and key intelligence topic variables. Our study was conducted in three stages:
1. We conducted initial semi-structured interviews with two senior managers from the prime contractor for IT systems at the INS and the Knowledge Management systems project champion, a senior INS law enforcement official who was responsible for corrective action in cases where the decisions of visa analysts were found to be inappropriate. From these interviews, we constructed a process model of the stages of visa approval, based on the knowledge creation, transfer, and use stages of the SECI model (Nonaka 1994) . We then identified key intelligence topics (KITs) underlying the decision model for visa approval at each stage. The KIT approach is used in competitive intelligence analysis to identify critical risk factors. It amounts to asking a difficult question to which there is no predefined answer, then deconstructing the topic question into answerable parts. This allows the otherwise-unanswerable topic question to be answered (Herring 1998) . We involved people who work in the organization in generating a set of critical issues for decisionmaking. Key intelligence topics included "early-warning" issues such as the size, location and specific demographics of the applicant pool at various INS offices; application turnaround time; access to decision support (both personal and systems); and quality of training, key decision-making points and issues. We validated and developed both the process model framework and the key intelligence topics at a workshop involving twentyfour analysts from the INS agency and twelve analysts from two law enforcement agencies in a second western economy that bordered on the first. These representatives provided a wide range of experience (from 2 to 25 years) and a variety of different knowledge domains relating to visa approval, from within the INS agency and from agencies interacting with the INS, permitting us to explore a diverse set of perspectives related to knowledge creation, transfer, and use in immigration visa application processing.
2. We then conducted small group and individual interviews in which analysts explored the decision-processes that they would use to answer these key intelligence questions and identified risk factors. Using the risk management cycle shown in Figure 2 (NCISSE, 1998), we explored the types of data used to answer the key intelligence questions generated during stage 1, at various points in the knowledge-management process. This introduced cognitive breakdowns that permitted analysts to reflect in depth on their decision-processes, including ways that a new IT system might be used to reduce workloads or might have the potential to improve the quality of individual decisions.
3. Finally, we conducted follow-up interviews with analysts at multiple levels of experience, senior INS managers, and senior managers from the prime information system vendor supporting the INS, to gain a comprehensive understanding of the current role of IT in providing decision-support for existing processes and the human decision-making issues associated with the potential of IT to support these high-risk decision-making processes.
We present the findings below under the three stages of investigation. The synthesis and discussion sections integrate findings from this study to develop knowledge-categories for highrisk decision-making and a set of roles for human analysts vs. IT decision-support systems.
Research Findings
As discussed above, the findings here represent a historical view of the problems of distributed knowledge management in a highly critical decision-making function: the granting of immigration visas to foreign nationals. It was surprising to discover that the system in place at that time was primarily 'pencil and paper' reporting, supplemented with (typed) memos between
analysts. There was very little cross-border knowledge transfer to improve immigration analysts' decision-making at the local level. Several explanations were given for this situation:
(1) a lack of funding for technology upgrades; (2) a historical reliance on a nation-based intake system; (3) increasing demand for visas; (4) language and culture (communication) barriers; (5) increased sophistication of applicants at the application stage of the process; and (6) international differences in personal privacy protections.
Although we identified several ways that a knowledge management system could benefit analysts as well as improve agency outcomes, we were not the architects of change. INS officials knew that improvements were badly needed. The events of 9/11 provided the impetus for funding a major review of immigration visa approval processes. The consultancy exercises of which this study was only a small part led to significant improvements in the use of knowledgemanagement systems and knowledge-transfer practices at the INS. So our report describes historical practices that have now become much more effective. This paper does not highlight current weaknesses in immigration services: systemic improvements have been made. But the weaknesses described are of interest as they illustrate problems of knowledge-sharing that are applicable to many organizations with distributed decision-making. For national security reasons, we cannot reflect upon the situation as it is, nor do we have access to all of this information.
Investigation Stage 1: Processes of Knowledge Creation and Use
During our investigation, the major issue appeared to be that analysts' individual knowledge and expertise were under-utilized in making the visa approval decision. The original visa approval process in use at the time of our investigation is shown in Figure 3 (this process has subsequently changed). The critical link in the visa approval process was identified as the immigration analyst, who was dealing with an avalanche of applications from unknown applicants. Applications from single males of Arab origin, entering the country from 26 high-risk global "hotspots" had been identified by the agency as a significant risk factor at the time that we conducted the study. We cannot provide details of how specific 'transborder' risks are defined and rated for risk management purposes, as this was deemed a matter of national security. But we were able to highlight problems in identifying the applicant's ethnicity and the point at which their immigration journey had originated, as discussed below. In our analysis, we focused on the role of the immigration analyst in acquiring, using and transferring knowledge within the INS organization. In discussions with analysts, we examined ways in which the four modes of knowledge acquisition and use defined in the SECI model of Figure 1 were achieved in their work environment.
Socialization. This stage is the process of acquiring new tacit knowledge through shared
experiences. New INS analysts served a period of "apprenticeship", working alongside a number of more experienced analysts from the same office, to understand the processes and criteria by which they approve visa applications. By this means, they were permitted to internalize skills and knowledge relating to local practices. They could also observe external events, security warnings and crises, to build a strong store of local knowledge. But they did not have access to the means of socialization that would enable them to become part of a wider community of professional practice. For example, they were not permitted to relate local knowledge to the knowledge held by analysts in visa approval offices of other countries or regions. Their knowledge was local: they were experts within their own domain of experience, but relative novices when judging applications outside of that domain. Because of their geographic proximity to various ports of entry, various INS offices tended to receive large numbers of applications from a well-defined set of ports of origin. When an application was received from a port of origin that was unusual for that office, or if an applicant had disguised their ethnicity by traveling via a different port of origin, any risks pertaining to this application might not be detected.
Externalization. This stage involves processes of converting tacit knowledge into explicit
knowledge. Analysts had very limited opportunity for externalization, as they were severely constrained by the pressures of work. There were few channels for them to engage in explicit learning, except through the informal apprenticeship process by which a new analyst was trained.
So INS analysts did not have the opportunity to subject their decision-making criteria to external assessment or validation, leading to single-loop learning (Argyris and Schön 1978) . They were not exposed to situations where they might experience a breakdown (Winograd and Flores 1986) and thus develop or externalize their model of decision-making. This meant that when an individual had been sensitized to specific risks, they lacked mechanisms or channels to sensitize other analysts to these risks.
Combination. This process involves converting explicit knowledge into systematic sets of explicit knowledge that are globally accessible and may involve both internal and external knowledge. Given the problems of externalization identified above, opportunities for combination were severely limited. The agency recognized and took steps to deal with this problem. Regular external security bulletins were circulated and knowledge of information deriving from security agency warnings was perceived to be high among analysts. But the main process of combination occurred during informal discussions in work breaks and at social events.
Some opportunities for breakdown (Winograd and Flores 1986) were provided by informal discussions. But more explicit and structured channels for this process were required, if analysts' decision-making frames were to be tested in a sufficient variety of situations.
Internalization. This is the process of embodying external, explicit knowledge into routines and unreflective procedures, so that it becomes internal and automatic to the individual. Analysts' work offered few explicit opportunities for this type of learning once their initial training was complete. Reflective capability was relegated to the personality of the individual. The pressure of work mitigated against reflection. Attempts to discuss process innovations met with little support because of the standardized, public service culture of the immigration service.
Investigation Stage 2: Key Intelligence Topics Indicating Significant Risk Factors
The INS review process used nation-based decision protocols to deal with transnational risks, with limited access to wider information and decision-support. This is not just a terrorist problem: analysts dealt with many problematic situations. For example, we were told of cases such as the individual whose visa had changed status on reentry to the country through their ignorance of the arcane immigration regulations but had been informed (wrongly) by a local INS analyst that they had retained their original status. At a later date, their spouse had applied for, and had been granted a visa under their original status, as the agency was so busy that analysts did not have time to perform checks against records held in other offices. This had only been detected on their application for visa renewal in a subsequent year. The individual's spouse was classified as an illegal alien, although they were ignorant of that fact.
A great many bottlenecks in the process were caused by reliance on the knowledge and expertise of individual analysts and by a failure to communicate knowledge between agency offices. We identified a number of critical issues for the management of knowledge within the visa approval process:
• Unequal knowledge: There was no "quality control" over the training, knowledgeability and decision-making capability of local analysts. This could often vary. Although all analysts were perceived as capable and trustworthy, the extent to which they were able to identify high-risk individuals varied. Advice provided to individuals with immigration questions was also highly variable, leading to subsequent problems and more bottlenecks.
• Locally-specific knowledge: Analysts relied on a wide variety of local knowledge and needed a wide exposure to many different personal name conventions and high-risk indicators for different sub-populations. Names of individuals may originate from phonetic languages, such as Mandarin or Arabic. The same original name is subject to a wide variety of roman-character spellings, phonetic interpretations and variations due to the individual's route to the USA. For example, forced migration serves to disburse populations into many geographic areas that are not interim rather than final destinations.
Along the way, the semantic meanings of individual demographics are blended and more interpretively useful demographic information can be lost.
• Distributed knowledge: Individuals might not be in possession of all the information to detect high-risk applications. For example, one analyst may detect multiple applications for entry with the same national-citizen as sponsor, so these applications could be refused. But if the individuals applied via different immigration offices, the multiple applications could go undetected.
• No legitimate way of collaborating or communicating knowledge: Different offices and different agencies operate under different cultural, national and legal frameworks. It was very difficult to communicate information between offices and the different management structures made coordination and collaboration difficult.
• Too high a volume of applications for an individual to screen all completely: Each analyst was operating under severe time constraints that often did not permit the analyst to even check the name and address of the local sponsor of the applicant.
All of these factors led to the conclusion that the identification of high-risk applications should be managed in a different way. But the decision to approve or reject an application depended on a huge variety of variables, risk identifiers and gut instinct. As such it was not easily codifiable.
The decision also depended on the combination of a number of factors that were locallycontingent and dynamic. Things change. High-risk factors for individual applicants are constantly being identified and a knowledge base using existing case-based reasoning would not permit the dynamic identification of risk identification factors.
Investigation Stage 3: Knowledge Management Priorities For IT Systems Support
Human analysts played the same role in filtering and appraising low-risk applications as they did for high-risk applications. To avoid accusations of favoritism, they used a first-in-first-out system of processing that might appreciably delay many low-risk applications while a high-risk application was investigated in depth. This way of working dated from an era when good technology support to separate routine decision-making from non-routine decisions was not available. The pressures of work meant that analysts did not have time to identify high-risk vs.
low-risk applications for separate processing streams. Nor did they have the time or energy to investigate high-risk applications as vigorously as required. So we identified components of the human analyst's approval decision and applied a risk analysis, to trigger breakdowns in their automatic assumptional framework. Decisions fell into three categories:
• Positive verification: Can we independently validate and verify information?
• Logical verification: Does the transaction make sense?
• Negative verification: Do we have the use of historical or other risk databases? Are past incidents predictive of future risk? If so, why, and if not, why not?
This was a relatively simple decision, but was based on a complex and dynamic set of variables.
We identified two "starting points" of the decision, characterized by internal (to the analyst) and external knowledge requirements. The questions that required an answer for internal and external knowledge management are shown in Table 1 . Automating the visa approval decision support system involved many factors, among them the verification and authentication of an individual applicant's personal identity. Example one demonstrates some of the issues involved in translating a name from another language.
Example #1. Family name. If an applicant enters NGUYEN, this is a typical Vietnamese family name. This family name would convey ethnicity and residence context as VIETNAM. We would not have any additional meaning, such as whether the applicant was (or was not) a communist, or loyal to the current government, as Vietnamese on both sides of the Vietnam conflict carry this name. However, if the applicant enters NGUY, this indicates that the individual is using a transliterated name from the Chinese, so the name is actually a legal fiction. This name conveys another layer of meaning about ethnicity, probable political persuasion, and even loyalty to family over country of residence, since many Chinese became refugees in the late 1940's when the Chinese communists pushed the nationalists out of mainland China, resulting in the separation of nuclear and extended families. There is little likelihood that a scoring system built on alphabet matching algorithms will capture these additional layers of meaning, especially if an analyst (in France, Germany or Canada, for example) is not familiar with Vietnamese transliteration systems. Being asked for "ALL" names in an automated visa approval system is not likely to facilitate capture of Chinese characters when the "legal" name is a transliteration and the data is keyed using a Western application via a keyboard.
To illustrate the complexity of combining tacit and explicit knowledge for an automated visa approval system, we present three variations in Example 2, taken from a single related concept, the applicant's name (family name, first name, middle name).
Example #2. First name. The typical Chinese name consists of 3 characters, a family name (character in the "first" position) and a personal name, generally a 2-character combination that represents the equivalent of a first name. This is not synonymous with discrete first and middle names, but the system may not accurately process a compound first name, even if separating the components of the name destroy the name itself. In Figure 4 , we take the first of a 2-character personal Chinese name and transliterate it into English using one of the more widely-known transliteration systems, Hanyu Pinyin (HP).
KUO
Character to English phonetic using Hanyu Pinyin transliteration system for converting Chinese Characters to Western alphabet (HP is not only system)
QUOC
Vietnamese transliteration
Strong
English translation -a particular meaning for "strong"
Figure 4: Three Translations of an Ideographic Firstname Character
In that transliteration, the character is spelled "KUO." Using a Vietnamese transliteration, however, the character becomes "QUOC." In a scoring system that matches letters of the alphabet to determine a score, the likelihood that the system would make the correct association of "SAME FIRST NAME" is slight. The situation is further complicated if a name is translated rather than transliterated. This same character translates as one meaning of the word "STRONG." However attempting to cross-validate or "reverse look-up" this English word will generally fail, as there are several dozen Chinese characters with rules of use and different meanings for "strong".
These examples demonstrate the difficulty of simply employing an IT-based knowledge-base to determine identity. The determination of identity requires a great deal of local knowledge, combined with a decision-making model that takes into account the various cultural permutations that apply to different routes of entry to the USA and the countries visited in transit. We focused attention on the subcomponents of the decision, to examine how a knowledge-base system might be utilized and on the breakdowns in decision support experienced by the analyst. Using the competitive intelligence model discussed above, we identified false assumptions embedded in the approval process, based on a global, rather than a local understanding of applicant criteria for risk analysis.
Synthesis: Determining Human-IT Role Divisions
The knowledge management problem was defined as determining a suitable role for the decision analyst, based on the strengths of human vs. machine decision-making and to determine how information systems could best support and codify various types of knowledge involved in the decision. We started our analysis by asking:
How may the two views of knowledge (knowledge-as-process and knowledge-as-thing) be reconciled through an appropriate balance between technology and human information processing?
Knowledge-As-Process: Determining A Suitable Role For The Analyst
This part of the analysis focused on adapting competitive intelligence techniques, that generally focus on knowledge-as-thing, to an examination of knowledge-as-process. We involved intelligence analysts in defining the key intelligence questions that governed their decision-making. Then we analyzed the processes by which these were made by categorizing according to the risks involved in specific cases of decision-making. We derived the model shown in Figure 5 from a content analysis of the INS analysts' categories of decision-making.
We discovered that the INS analysts distinguished between context-specific, local knowledge and generalizable rules of decision-making. They also distinguished between explicit knowledge, that could be articulated in explaining an espoused theory or rationale, and the tacit knowledge that guided their theory-in-use (Argyris and Schön 1978) . The model of Figure 5 represents the types of human knowledge management that we discovered to be involved in a knowledge-as-process view of analysts' decision-making. We explored the mechanisms by which various types of knowledge were acquired and transferred, between analysts in the same office and across INS offices. Transferable knowledge appeared to be managed well, for the existing process. New analysts at the INS served an effective apprenticeship, assisting more experienced analysts until they became competent decisionmakers. The constraint on their competency was imposed by two elements: time constraints and access to sufficient risk-management information. Hidden knowledge was the most problematic.
Analysts frequently referred to what we categorized as the hidden knowledge of automaticity.
This hidden knowledge was embedded in the assumptional frameworks employed by analysts and could only be acquired through experiential learning or participation in the decision-making processes of groups in other offices. While individual analysts did learn from their mistakes, this was not communicated to other analysts. Breakdowns could be triggered by follow up reviews of individual cases, or debates between analysts about risk assessment criteria that surfaced and challenged implicit models of decision-making. Opportunities for this type of learning were constrained by limited access to information about individuals that they had approved and limited time to interact in debate. This observation indicated a need for discoverable knowledge that could be provided by analysis of historical data. Inference engines and case-based reasoning tools are widely available. We identified the need for a suitable model of risk assessment, to indicate a suitable type of computer support for this knowledge. Finally, programmable knowledge was widely available locally, but its efficacy was constrained by a lack of access to risk-indicator variables that "everybody knew about" at one office, but that were not communicated between offices. Much of this knowledge was so obvious to experienced analysts that no-one bothered to record it, so it was acquired only slowly by new analysts.
Knowledge-As-Thing: Determining Roles For Computer-Based Knowledge Management
In this analysis, we adopted a processual analysis, more often applied to the determination of human work-roles, to define roles for IT systems as proxy "actors" in the distributed system of human and computerized decision-making at INS offices. We noted that the INS did not recognize the potential for computer-based information systems to enable individuals and groups to transfer critical knowledge in a timely fashion at a local level. While many of the knowledgesharing problems were caused by too much work and too little time to collaborate effectively, there was a failure to recognize that IT could be used to support and supplement human decisionmaking, rather than simply providing human analysts with the information to make decisions.
We found that employing a competitive intelligence model of risk analysis (Heinrichs and Lim 2005; Herring 1998; NCISSE 1998; Noyes 2004; Pattakos 1998 ) permitted us to apply insights about suitable roles for IT to support or supplement the human processes for each of the four stages of knowledge creation and transfer identified by the SECI model (Nonaka 1994 ).
1. The first role for IT in this process was to provide an application processing system that dealt with the routine cases. Processes in the codifiable knowledge quartile of Figure 5 could easily be automated. The key intelligence issue was to identify those cases that were sufficiently routine to be processed automatically. A scoring system was suggested, based on standard competitive intelligence techniques, to identify such cases. Early warning is a key factor in managing national security risks. The automated scoring system permitted applicants who might pose a security threat to be identified soon after they applied for a visa, allowing security analysts to assess these applications as a matter of priority early in the threat timeline.
2. To improve knowledge management in decision support, the human analyst needed to be able to evaluate intent to harm when a high-risk individual was identified by the knowledgebased information system (role 1) and to manually enter information concerning high-risk factors that would affect the role 1 categorization of cases but which might not be obtainable from historical data (for example, intelligence concerning recently-detected ways of deceiving the visa evaluation process). This gave us a second role of IT: to provide a repository of novel observations or lessons learned, that are realized during routine work. To provide such realizations, we needed to uncover the discoverable knowledge identified in the previous section. This could be achieved through generating cognitive (Winograd and Flores, 1986) . Breakdowns disrupted automaticity as new risks emerged through discussions of specific cases. These processes of socialization could only take place in a local, face-to-face context. Given the pressure of work, business processes needed to be redesigned for such interactions to occur so that individuals --even experienced analysts --could share emergent knowledge. We would suggest an ongoing mentor or apprentice role, where analysts are rotated regularly between mentors, to facilitate this process. Trained mentors could generate breakdowns by explicitly questioning the criteria by which decisions are made. The externalization of knowledge also required a more formal role in work design. We felt that quality circle discussions (Ishikawa 1985) , held on a regular basis, would provide opportunities for reflection, knowledge-surfacing and the triggering of cognitive breakdowns to suggest changes to the assumptions underlying automatic decision-making.
3. Combination of knowledge across geographically and temporally dispersed analyst groups required the use of a formal knowledge-base system to provide global consistency in decision-making, the third role for IT in this process. A formal knowledge-base would require incentives for use by local analysts, who were often overworked. It was recommended that time spent in updating knowledge-base entries be recognized in work reviews and the compensation system. It was also recommended that time spent using the knowledge-base should be incentivized in contextually appropriate ways and that discoveries pertaining to local practices should be formally recorded for use by others, or raised at quality circle meetings. This would allow the use of transferable knowledge to be interpreted locally for adoption within a specific work-group (Lave and Wenger 1991) and would encourage discoverable knowledge to be shared across work-groups. Using a first-in-first-out application processing method had resulted in substantial backlog. After 9/11, the problem was considerably worse due to individual risk avoidance behaviors, which meant that applications were delayed when analysts were uncertain what action to take. To quote a senior INS official, "Paper keeps falling on the floor." The transfer of blame for decisions from the individual to the group would provide a powerful incentive to use such a system. But to make this type of knowledge management system effective would also require changes to the reward structures that encourage the externalization, combination, and internalization of organizational knowledge.
4. Knowledge internalization requires the opportunity for reflection (Schön 1983) . We felt that this offered a fourth role for IT: to provide an online training system, based on cases from the knowledge-base. The need to justify one's logic, or to engage in debate about process evaluation with the "organizational web" of stakeholders in the decision would provide ways to generate productive breakdowns (Winograd and Flores 1986) , permitting analysts to break frame in their use of automatized decision-criteria and frameworks (Goffman 1974) . In this way, hidden knowledge could be converted to transferable knowledge, which in turn would be converted to codifiable knowledge. We could envisage a computer-based application that would lead analysts through a structured walkthrough of the risk-analysis that underlay their decision and construct a risk-framework, comparing one analyst's framework to another's anonymously, then engaging them in a simulated debate to generate productive breakdowns.
Questioning the automatic frameworks underlying decision-making should be a process that is required periodically, for one case randomly selected per month or per week, for example. Such a system would provide an excellent mechanism for innovation and move away from automaticity, making the visa approval process more adaptive to new circumstances.
Discussion of Findings Hybrid Intelligence in Knowledge Management
From this analysis, we derived a model of hybrid intelligence in knowledge management, shown in Figure 6 . Our concept of hybrid intelligence combines the artificial intelligence stages of collect, verify, store/disseminate, and reuse [reified] knowledge (Weber et al. 2001 ) with a situated, human-activity view of knowledge-as-process. By reference to the work-processes identified as critical in our analysis of the case presented above, our model demonstrates how examining different roles for IT in supporting different categories of knowledge work revealed the stages of human decision-making in this case to be (i) risk-category identification, (ii) application of risk-categories to decision-cases, (iii) extension of categories to integrate with cases from other communities of practice (testing and adapting categorizations against global conditions), and (iv) a transfer of meaningful categorizations of risk across communities. These stages may provide a basis for the analysis of other high-risk decision-making environments. There were two critical elements in analyzing the system of INS information processing and decision-making as a hybrid intelligence system, that were suggested from understanding the cyclical relationships between internalized and externalized knowledge and the different forms of process by which each is transformed into the other:
1. By involving INS analysts in defining the key intelligence questions that they faced and the mechanisms by which risks were increased or reduced in making decisions around each of these, we understood how incentives and reward-structures worked with or against reflective knowledge externalization and how organizational and work structures enabled or constrained knowledge-sharing. We have demonstrated the benefits of adapting a competitive intelligence risk-analysis technique, that normally focuses on the analysis of knowledge-as-thing, to the investigation of human knowledge processes.
2. By focusing on human knowledge and information-processing first and IT support for these processes second, we were able to delineate four, distinct roles for IT systems that are shown in Figure 6 . These roles were previously conflated when determining IT support requirements for intelligence analysts at the INS. We have demonstrated the benefits of adapting the work-role analysis that underlies the knowledge-as-process perspective to provide a structure for IT-based information processing in complex decision-support.
As the research focused on agencies involved with national security, we could not engage fully in implementation of the plan. Aspects of the investigation that concerned the development of a suitable technology support system have been discussed elsewhere (Shelfer and Verner 2002a; 2002b) . Ours was a relatively small role in a much wider change initiative that involved many other groups of consultants and academics. We have gathered from news reports and our own sources that practice has changed radically in the INS visa approval process. We did not provide the only inputs to this change consultation process and we cannot take credit for these improvements.
Combinatorial Analysis of Knowledge Processes
From our analysis of knowledge-as-process, we derived four classes of knowledge that communicate a human interpretation of what knowledge is. These four classes of knowledge, shown in Figure 5 , provide deeper insights into the knowledge management problem than the declarative/procedural distinction (Anderson 1993 ) that is generally employed in understanding the problem of knowledge codification. When analysts expressed their concern that certain types of knowledge were inarticulable, they signified that their decision-making frames could not be articulated, even to themselves. When analysts expressed a concern that certain types of decision rested on local knowledge, they were expressing an understanding that a similar situation might be interpreted differently, depending upon the degree to which an analyst had been exposed to the risks of specific situations. These classes of knowledge were clearly related not to the situation, but to the analyst and their experience within the social context of work. Of particular concern was the hidden knowledge of automaticity -the understanding and framing of emergent criteria for decision-making that are embedded in automatic decision-making processes. Hidden knowledge resulted from the relative isolation of analysts in their work. While hidden knowledge falls in the top-right quartile of the knowledge management process model of Figure 5 , a breakdown in automatic information processing was required to move the analyst's knowledge into the Transferable Knowledge or Discoverable Knowledge quartile, where it could be communicated or explicitly evaluated. We have suggested both human and computer-based mechanisms to generate productive breakdowns (Winograd and Flores 1986) . From our application of competitive intelligence analysis techniques to the knowledge processes that we uncovered, we provided an integrative approach by which support for these processes could be operationalized by viewing knowledge-as-thing. We subjected the findings from our analysis of knowledge processes to a competitive intelligence risk analysis, determining critical risk factors and key intelligence questions relating to INS analysts management of local knowledge (Herring 1998; Herring 1999) , and thus defining integrative and interrelated roles for human decisionmaking and for automated decision-support. This approach is very different than the traditional approach to systems requirements determination, that provides support for only those activities of a business processes for which knowledge has already been reified -the articulable processes of Figure 5 .
We applied the taxonomy of knowledge distinctions that is presented in Figure 5 to reveal large amounts of hidden knowledge that knowledge-workers were unable to share, even when they considered such knowledge critical to the organizational mission of the INS. This indicated the need for significant changes to knowledge management processes and strategy. We applied competitive intelligence analysis techniques to identify critical knowledge-management mechanisms, integrating the process analysis with a codification approach to suggest how changes required for processual knowledge management were related to changes required to IT systems support for knowledge management. This resulted in a general framework for human vs.
IT roles in distributed knowledge management, shown in figure 6 . The framework shown in Figure 6 has a set of stages that develop the concepts of the SECI model of knowledge creation and use (Nonaka 1994; Nonaka and Konno 1998) . The SECI model is limited in its application to organizational knowledge management, in that it considers only the human processes of knowledge-creation and use -a knowledge-as-process view. By combining a processual approach with a risk-analysis based on competitive intelligence techniques (Heinrichs and Lim 2005; Herring 1998; NCISSE 1998; Noyes 2004; Pattakos 1998) , we were able to gain deep insights into appropriate roles for both humans and IT in high-risk decision-making environments, relating the analysis of knowledge-as-thing to the analysis of knowledge-asprocess to produce a truly integrated perspective.
Conclusions
Zack (2001) asks "if managing knowledge is the solution, then what's the problem?", assessing his response in terms of complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity and equivocality. We would suggest that these four terms barely scratch the surface in expressing the situatedness and internal, experiential, and dynamic nature of knowledge acquisition and use. We speak of "knowledge transfer" as if it is unproblematic -just a matter of applying a structured set of analytical procedures to produce knowledge that is articulable and externalizable. We have presented a situated analysis of the processes of knowledge creation and use in a complex, emergent and dynamic decision-making environment to illustrate how messy and social these processes are in real-life. We have suggested a hybrid intelligence approach to analyzing how distributed knowledge is communicated and transferred, that combines the use of competitive intelligence techniques to categorize decisions with a role analysis to identify different forms of knowledge creation and transfer between humans and IT-based decision support systems. We also demonstrated how knowledge transfer and learning failed to take place, because of the ways in which work and training were organized, knowledge was not communicated between locations, reward structures were organized, and because of inappropriate IT system support for the types of decisions involved.
The objective of the paper was to explore how a knowledge-as-thing view of organizational knowledge management might be reconciled with a knowledge-as-process perspective, i.e. to investigate how we might achieve an appropriate balance between knowledgeable human information processing and information technology support for distributed, emergent knowledge processes. In exploring this issue, we attempted to deal with the situatedness of complex, distributed, dynamic and ill-understood knowledge for high-risk decision-making by applying a multi-dimensional analysis process. The contribution of this paper is to combine knowledge-asthing perspectives with knowledge-as-process perspectives by presenting a framework for knowledge management as the analysis of hybrid intelligence. We provide a novel taxonomy for the analysis of organizational knowledge-flows ( Figure 5 ) and we suggest a process-framework by which roles for IT support in a complex and distributed, high-risk decision-making environment may be defined ( Figure 6 ). These models may be applicable to a variety of distributed decision-making contexts and could provide support for knowledge management strategy in practice, as well as providing a basis for future theory development.
The study reported in this paper demonstrates how a multi-level analysis of decision-making in knowledge management can contribute significantly to a very different understanding of how to organize work and knowledge in critical decision-making environments than that obtained from a traditional, functional analysis. The lessons learned from this case and the resulting models are applicable to a wide variety of emergent and dynamic knowledge processes in organizational decision-making.
